IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v80y2012i2p497-558.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence From Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals

Author

Listed:
  • Ulf von Lilienfeld‐Toal
  • Dilip Mookherjee
  • Sujata Visaria

Abstract

It is generally presumed that strengthening the enforcement of lender rights expands the set of incentive compatible loan contracts, resulting in increased access to credit for all types of borrowers. This is based on an implicit assumption of inlnitely elastic supply of loans. With inelastic supply, strengthening enforcement can result in greater exclusion of poor borrowers from credit markets and a reallocation of credit from poor to wealthy borrowers. Using a dataset of capital project loans given by a large Indian bank to lrms of varying asset sizes, we lnd evidence of such adverse distributional impacts of a reform to strengthen lender rights implemented across Indian states in the 1990s.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Ulf von Lilienfeld‐Toal & Dilip Mookherjee & Sujata Visaria, 2012. "The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence From Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(2), pages 497-558, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:80:y:2012:i:2:p:497-558
    DOI: ECTA9038
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.3982/ECTA9038
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/ECTA9038?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philippe Aghion & Robin Burgess & Stephen J. Redding & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2008. "The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1397-1412, September.
    2. Sujata Visaria, 2009. "Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(3), pages 59-81, July.
    3. Reint Gropp & John Karl Scholz & Michelle J. White, 1997. "Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 217-251.
    4. Gordon, Roger H & Bovenberg, A Lans, 1996. "Why Is Capital So Immobile Internationally? Possible Explanations and Implications for Capital Income Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1057-1075, December.
    5. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    6. Igor Livshits & James MacGee & Michèle Tertilt, 2007. "Consumer Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 402-418, March.
    7. Christopher James & David C. Smith, 2000. "Are Banks Still Special? New Evidence on Their Role in the Corporate Capital‐Raising Process," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 13(1), pages 52-63, March.
    8. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2004. "Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 91-134.
    9. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    10. Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal, 2002. "Political Intervention in Debt Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1103-1134, October.
    11. Satyajit Chatterjee & Dean Corbae & Makoto Nakajima & José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, 2007. "A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1525-1589, November.
    12. Erica Field, 2007. "Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1561-1602.
    13. Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 249-275.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ayyagari, Meghana & Beck, Thorsten & Hoseini, Mohammad, 2020. "Finance, law and poverty: Evidence from India," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    2. Dimas Mateus Fazio & Thiago Christiano Silva, 2020. "Housing Collateral Reform and Economic Reallocation," Working Papers Series 522, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    3. Koudijs, Peter & Salisbury, Laura, 2020. "Limited liability and investment: Evidence from changes in marital property laws in the US South, 1840–1850," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 1-26.
    4. Mendoza, Ronald U. & Canare, Tristan A. & Ang, Alvin, 2015. "Doing Business: A Review of Literature and Its Role in APEC 2015," Research Paper Series DP 2015-37, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
    5. Aloisio Araujo & Bruno Funchal, 2015. "How Much Should Debtors be Punished in Case of Default?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 229-245, April.
    6. Nuri Ersahin & Rustom M. Irani & Katherine Waldock, 2016. "Creditor Rights and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Fraudulent Transfer Law," Working Papers 16-31, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    7. Vincenzo Pezone, 2023. "The Real Effects of Judicial Enforcement," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(3), pages 889-933.
    8. Ang, Alvin & Mendoza, Ronald U. & Canare, Tristan A., 2015. "Doing Business: A Review of Literature and Its Role in APEC 2015," Discussion Papers DP 2015-37, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
    9. Beck, T.H.L., 2010. "Legal Institutions and Economic Development," Other publications TiSEM 8aa07b48-ce55-4cf6-8754-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Rathinam Francis Xavier & Raja Angara Viswasundara, 2010. "Law and Availability of Credit: Evidence from India," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 1-26, December.
    11. Beck, Thorsten & Ayyagari, Meghana, 2013. "Finance and Poverty: Evidence from India," CEPR Discussion Papers 9497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Viktar Fedaseyeu & Robert M. Hunt, 2014. "The economics of debt collection: enforcement of consumer credit contracts," Working Papers 14-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    13. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem & Papaioannou, Elias & Peydró, José-Luis, 2010. "What lies beneath the euro's effect on financial integration? Currency risk, legal harmonization, or trade?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 75-88, May.
    14. Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan & Elias Papaioannou & José-Luis Peydró, 2013. "Financial Regulation, Financial Globalization, and the Synchronization of Economic Activity," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(3), pages 1179-1228, June.
    15. Gani Aldashev, 2009. "Legal institutions, political economy, and development," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 25(2), pages 257-270, Summer.
    16. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    17. Florian Oswald & Costas Meghir & Wenli Li, 2017. "Consumer Bankruptcy and Mortgage Default," 2017 Meeting Papers 1260, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    18. Gupta, Poonam & Hasan, Rana & Kumar, Utsav, 2009. "Big Reforms but Small Payoffs: Explaining the Weak Record of Growth and Employment in Indian Manufacturing," MPRA Paper 13496, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Lance J. Lochner & Alexander Monge-Naranjo, 2011. "The Nature of Credit Constraints and Human Capital," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2487-2529, October.
    20. Viral V. Acharya & Krishnamurthy V. Subramanian, 2009. "Bankruptcy Codes and Innovation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(12), pages 4949-4988, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:80:y:2012:i:2:p:497-558. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.