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Legal institutions, political economy, and development

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  • Gani Aldashev

Abstract

This article reviews some of the recent literature on the relationship between the legal system and economic development. We also look at the historical, socio-cultural, and political factors that explain the differences in the characteristics of legal systems across countries and thus affect the link between the legal environment and economic outcomes. Although the field of law and economics of developing countries is still in its youth, it is growing rapidly and is a fertile ground for exciting new findings, both theoretical and empirical. Further progress in this field is likely to come from the studies of the elements of the legal system other than the substantive law (enforcement and dispute resolution) and should move beyond specific analyses of the impact of particular success or failure stories towards more general analyses of the determinants and outcomes of successful legal institutions. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oxrep/grp016
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Review of Economic Policy.

Volume (Year): 25 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 257-270

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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:25:y:2009:i:2:p:257-270

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References

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  1. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 949-995, October.
  2. Sonin, Konstantin, 2003. "Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 715-731, December.
  3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2007. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," NBER Working Papers 13608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Sujata Visaria, 2006. "Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-157, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  5. Matthieu Chemin, 2007. "The Impact of the Judiciary on Entrepreneurship: Evaluation of Pakistan's Access to Justice Programme," Cahiers de recherche 0727, CIRPEE.
  6. Aldashev, Gani & Chaara, Imane & Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2012. "Using the law to change the custom," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 182-200.
  7. Brasselle, Anne-Sophie & Gaspart, Frederic & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2002. "Land tenure security and investment incentives: puzzling evidence from Burkina Faso," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 373-418, April.
  8. Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, 2008. "Economics and Politics of Alternative Institutional Reforms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 123(3), pages 1197-1250, August.
  9. Sujata Visaria, 2006. "Legal Reform and Loan Repayment:The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-023, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  10. Markus Goldstein & Christopher Udry, 2008. "The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 981-1022, December.
  11. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-37, October.
  12. Rafael Di Tella & Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2007. "The Formation of Beliefs: Evidence from the Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(1), pages 209-241, 02.
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Cited by:
  1. Kim Economides & Alfred A. Haug & Joe McIntyre, 2013. "Are Courts Slow? Exposing and Measuring the Invisible Determinants of Case Disposition Time," Working Papers 1317, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2013.
  2. Olivier STERCK & Olivia D’AOUST, 2012. "Who Benefits from Customary Justice? Rent-seeking, Bribery and Criminality in Sub-Saharan Africa," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2012015, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  3. Antonio David & Fabiano Rodrigues Bastos & Marshall Mills, 2011. "Post-conflict Recovery: Institutions, Aid, or Luck?," IMF Working Papers 11/149, International Monetary Fund.

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