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Trees, Tenure and Conflict: Rubber in Colonial Benin

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  • James Fenske

Abstract

Tree crops have changed land tenure in Africa. Farmers have acquired more permanent, alienable rights, but have also faced disputes with competing claimants and the state. I show that the introduction of Para rubber had similar effects in the Benin region of colonial Nigeria. Farmers initially obtained land by traditional methods. Mature farms were assets that could be sold, let out, and used to raise credit.

Suggested Citation

  • James Fenske, 2011. "Trees, Tenure and Conflict: Rubber in Colonial Benin," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2011-029, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2011-029
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Quisumbing, Agnes R & Payongayong, Ellen & Aidoo, J B & Otsuka, Keijiro, 2001. "Women's Land Rights in the Transition to Individualized Ownership: Implications for Tree-Resource Management in Western Ghana," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 157-181, October.
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    2. Perego, Viviana M.E., 2019. "Crop prices and the demand for titled land: Evidence from Uganda," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 93-109.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agricultural industries; Land reform; Land tenure; Right of property; Social conflict;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N57 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Africa; Oceania
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

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