The Political Economy of Rural Property Rights and the Persistence of the Dual Economy
AbstractIf property rights in land are so beneficial, why are they not adopted more widely? I propose a theory based on the idea that limited property rights over peasants' plots may be supported by elite landowners (who depend on peasants for labour) to achieve two goals. First, like other distortions such as taxation, limited property rights reduce peasants' income from their own plots, generating a cheap labour force. Second, and unlike taxation, they force peasants to remain in the rural sector to protect their property, even if job opportunities appear in the urban sector. The theory identifies conditions under which weak property rights institutions emerge, providing a specific mechanism for the endogenous persistence of inefficient rural institutions as development unfolds. It also predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the quality of rural property rights and land in the hands of peasants.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad de Los Andes, Economics Department in its series Documentos CEDE Series with number 146455.
Date of creation: Jun 2012
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Political economy; institutions; economic development; taxation; property rights; land; dualism; Political Economy; H2; N10; O1; O10; P16;
Other versions of this item:
- Fergusson, Leopoldo, 2013. "The political economy of rural property rights and the persistence of the dual economy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 167-181.
- Leopoldo Fergusson, 2012. "The Political Economy of Rural Property Rights and the Persistence of the Dual Economy," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 009797, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative
- O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-04-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-IUE-2013-04-13 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2013-04-13 (Post Keynesian Economics)
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