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Explaining de facto judicial independence

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  • Bernd Hayo

    (University of Duisburg-Essen)

  • Stefan Voigt

    (University of Kassel)

Abstract

Judicial Independence (JI) as factually implemented varies considerably between countries. Since de iure JI is an imperfect predictor of de facto JI, a number of variables that might determine the factual level of judicial independence is theoretically discussed and empirically tested. A distinction between factors that can be influenced in the short run and those that are the result of historical development and are exempt from short-term modification is made. Ascertaining the relative relevance of these two groups of variables promises to be policy-relevant because attempts to make judiciaries more independent within governance programs might be seriously constrained by factors beyond the control of national governments and international organizations.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 0306001.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 25 Jun 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0306001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 33; figures: included
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: Judicial independence; informal institutions; formal institutions;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Papageorgiadis, Nikolaos & Cross, Adam R. & Alexiou, Constantinos, 2013. "The impact of the institution of patent protection and enforcement on entry mode strategy: A panel data investigation of U.S. firms," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 278-292.
  2. Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2005. "Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 57, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
  3. Arusha Cooray, 2012. "Suffrage, Democracy and Gender Equality in Education," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(1), pages 21-47, June.
  4. Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2012. "Explaining Constitutional Change: The Case of Judicial Independence," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201249, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  5. Jaroslaw Kantorowicz, 2014. "Judges as Fiscal Activists: Can Constitutional Review Shape Public Finance?," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 79-104, June.
  6. Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "The Relevance of Judicial Procedure for Economic Growth," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200828, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  7. Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
  8. George Tridimas, 2010. "Constitutional judicial review and political insurance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 81-101, February.
  9. Padovano, Fabio & Fiorino, Nadia, 2012. "Strategic delegation and “judicial couples” in the Italian Constitutional Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 215-223.
  10. Fabio Padovano, 2009. "The time-varying independence of Italian peak judicial institutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 230-250, September.

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