This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2005-04-16 (All new papers)
• NEP-CBA-2005-04-16 (Central Banking)
• NEP-LAW-2005-04-16 (Law & Economics)
• NEP-MON-2005-04-16 (Monetary Economics)
• NEP-REG-2005-04-16 (Regulation)
• NEP-SEA-2005-04-16 (South East Asia)

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   • Bernd Hayo and Stefan Voigt, 2005. "Explaining de facto Judicial Independence," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200507, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
   • Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2003. "Explaining de facto judicial independence," ICER Working Papers 01-2004, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2007. "Explaining de facto judicial independence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 269-290, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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5. Lars Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2003. "Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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   • Feld, Lars P. & Voigt, Stefan, 2003. "Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 497-527, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Haan, Jakob de, 2001. "Inflation in developing countries: does Central Bank independence matter?," CCSO Working Papers 200101, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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   • Sturm, Jan-Egbert & de Haan, Jakob, 2001. "Inflation in Developing Countries: Does Central Bank Independence Matter?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
7. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997. "Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1111-1146, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Svensson, L-E-O, 1996. "Inflation Forecast Targeting : Implementaing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," Papers 615, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
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   • Svensson, Lars E O, 1996. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," CEPR Discussion Papers 1511, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Lars E. O. Svensson, 1997. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," NBER Working Papers 5797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Lars E O Svensson, . "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," Bank of England working papers 56, Bank of England.
8. Forder, James, 1998. "The case for an independent European central bank: A reassessment of evidence and sources," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 53-71, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
10. Moser, Peter, 1999. "Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1569-1593, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Sergio Clavijo, . "Central Banking and Macroeconomic Coordination: The Case of Colombia," Borradores de Economia 159, Banco de la Republica de Colombia. [Downloadable!]
12. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
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14. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 195-225. [Downloadable!]
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    • Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
15. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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17. Romer, David, 1993. "Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(4), pages 869-903, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • David Romer, 1991. "Openness and inflation: theory and evidence," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov.
18. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Sergio Clavijo, 2000. "Central Banking and Macroeconomic Coordination: The Case of Colombia," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 002113, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA. [Downloadable!]
20. Philip Keefer, 2001. "Politics and the Determinants of Banking Crises: the Effects of Political Checks and Balances," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 119, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
21. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Berger, Helge & Haan, Jakob de & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    • Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2353, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)