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Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote

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  • Barzel, Y
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    Abstract

    What could explain the emergence of parliament and its ascendancy? I argue that dictatorial kings encountered difficulties in securing the cooperation of their subjects because they could not commit not to confiscate subjects' gains. Where the gain from cooperation increased and kings were more secure, they deliberately gave up some of their power to be able to commit themselves to keep their promises.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 97-13.

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    Length: 32 pages
    Date of creation: 1997
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:97-13

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    Keywords: POLITICS ; PARLIAMENT;

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    Cited by:
    1. Jim Rose & Simon Hay, 2001. "Three Steps Towards More Effective Development Assistance," Treasury Working Paper Series 01/26, New Zealand Treasury.
    2. Dalibor Roháč, 2008. "The unanimity rule and religious fractionalisation in the Polish-Lithuanian Republic," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 111-128, June.
    3. Mark Koyama, 2010. "The political economy of expulsion: the regulation of Jewish moneylending in medieval England," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 374-406, December.

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