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Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote

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Author Info
Barzel, Y
Abstract

What could explain the emergence of parliament and its ascendancy? I argue that dictatorial kings encountered difficulties in securing the cooperation of their subjects because they could not commit not to confiscate subjects' gains. Where the gain from cooperation increased and kings were more secure, they deliberately gave up some of their power to be able to commit themselves to keep their promises.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 97-13.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:97-13

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Related research
Keywords: POLITICS PARLIAMENT

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

Cited by:
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  1. Stefan Voigt, 2005. "Membership has its Privileges - On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally," Discussion Papers in Economics 73/05, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jim Rose & Simon Hay, 2001. "Three Steps Towards More Effective Development Assistance," Treasury Working Paper Series 01/26, New Zealand Treasury. [Downloadable!]
  3. Stefan Voigt & Michael Ebeling & Lorenz Blume, 2004. "Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence - the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," Discussion Papers in Economics 67/04, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-10-10.

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