Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution : The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote
AbstractWhat could explain the emergence of parliament and its ascendancy? I argue that dictatorial kings encountered difficulties in securing the cooperation of their subjects because they could not commit not to confiscate subjects' gains. Where the gain from cooperation increased and kings were more secure, they deliberately gave up some of their power to be able to commit themselves to keep their promises.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 97-13.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
POLITICS ; PARLIAMENT;
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