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Parliament as a wealth-maximizing institution: The right to the residual and the right to vote

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Barzel, Yoram
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 17 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 455-474
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:4:p:455-474

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  1. Stefan Voigt, 2005. "Membership has its Privileges - On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally," Discussion Papers in Economics 73/05, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Dalibor Roháč, 2008. "The unanimity rule and religious fractionalisation in the Polish-Lithuanian Republic," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 111-128, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jim Rose & Simon Hay, 2001. "Three Steps Towards More Effective Development Assistance," Treasury Working Paper Series 01/26, New Zealand Treasury. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stefan Voigt & Michael Ebeling & Lorenz Blume, 2004. "Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence - the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," Discussion Papers in Economics 67/04, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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