NEP-PBE-2003-07-04

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Report NEP-PBE-2003-07-04

This is the archive for NEP-PBE, a report on new working papers in the area of Public Economics. Oliver Budzinski issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-PBE

The following items were anounced in this report:

Roland Vaubel & Axel Dreher & Ugurlu Soylu, 2003. "Staff Growth in International Organizations: A Principal-Agent Problem? An Empirical Analysis," Public Economics 0306006, EconWPA, revised 08 Jul 2003. [Downloadable!]
Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2003. "Explaining de facto judicial independence," Law and Economics 0306001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Axel Dreher & Lars-H.R. Siemers, 2003. "The Intriguing Nexus Between Corruption and Capital Account Restrictions," Development and Comp Systems 0306004, EconWPA, revised 07 Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
Giorgio Coricelli & Dietmar Fehr & Gerlinde Fellner, 2003. "Partner selection in public goods experiments," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-13, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
Loren Brandt & Matthew A. Turner, 2003. "The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections," Working Papers brandt-03-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
Rodrigo J. Harrison, 2003. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Substitutes," Game Theory and Information 0306003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

This page was last updated on 2009-12-13.

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