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Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits

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Author Info
Edward López ()
R. Jewell ()

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Abstract

States’ choices on term limits are quantified as a multiple-categorical variable capturing variation in the type of limits passed. Measures of relative political influence in Congress explain much of this variation. Using 1992 data on the American states, the model controls for unobserved heterogeneity due to voter access to direct democracy in some states. At 2002 values for congressional tenure and federal spending, the model predicts approximately eight to ten additional states would choose to limit their own members’ terms but cannot under a Supreme Court ruling. We discuss implications for institutional federalism and the potential passage of similar political institutions across the states. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-006-9139-4
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 132 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 137-157
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:1:p:137-157

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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Keywords: Term limits Political institutions Federalism Political economy

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  11. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 769-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Edward Glaeser, 1997. "Self-imposed term limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 389-394, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Case, Anne C. & Rosen, Harvey S. & Hines, James Jr., 1993. "Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence : Evidence from the states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 285-307, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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