The Role of Auction Design in Awarding Spectrum
AbstractAuctions play an important role in economics. In their most basic form, they are one of the ways in which various commodities, financial assets and concession rights are allocated to individuals and firms, particularly in a market-oriented setting. An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants. Since some products such as spectrum concessions have no standard value, auctions provide one way approaching the question of price formation of these products.This paper explores the details of Turkish GSM 1800 MHz auction held in April, 2000 within auction theory and competition policies framework. According to the findings of this study, since the auction design inappropriately dealt with market conditions, Is-Tim, winning bidders of one of two spectrums on offer, was able to make a high bid by deriving the price of first license, the reserve price of second one, up to excessive level, so other bidders were not able to afford to bid over this price at second round. First finding of this study is that Is-Tim is either predatory pricer or winner s curse both of which undermines general economic efficiency. As a result by not selling second license, Turkish GSM market has been unnecessarily concentrated; Turkish Treasury has obtained less revenue than it would; and the liability of TT owner of third license at the extremely high winning price of the first license, has soared more than what it otherwise would be by possibly undermining the market value of TT.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0209001.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 10 Sep 2002
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 28; figures: separate but included
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Auction; Competition Policies; Concession; Spectrum Rights; Turkey;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-09-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2002-09-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-REG-2002-09-28 (Regulation)
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