Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Bidding for concessions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Klein, Michael

Abstract

Privatization of infrastructure ventures in sectors such as energy, telecommunication, transport, and water has become popular over the last decade. Often- for good or bad reasons - private firms are given monopoly franchises under some type of long-term concession agreement, for example"Build-Operate-Transfer"schemes. The article surveys the issues arising in designing specifications as well as incentive and risk-sharing parameters comprehensively and consistently both to achieve efficient performance by the concessionaire and to minimize post-award renegotiations. Concession award should as a rule be made competitively, unless special requirements of speed, innovation, or excessive transaction cost argue otherwise. Typically, competitive concession award is made by first price sealed bids. There are strong arguments, however, to consider open auctions more seriously in a number of cases. Auctions may also be re-awarded by way of auction. However, somewhat arbitrary bid preferences may have to be set. Auctioneers for complex concession contracts should operate at arms-length from all interested parties, including politicians. It may be sensible to let independent agencies that regulate the concession scheme run the auction.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/07/28/000094946_00071505323725/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1957.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 31 Aug 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1957

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Email:
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Decentralization; Environmental Economics&Policies; Markets and Market Access; International Terrorism&Counterterrorism; Economic Theory&Research; International Terrorism&Counterterrorism; Environmental Economics&Policies; Access to Markets; Markets and Market Access; Economic Theory&Research;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "Anomalies: The Winner's Curse," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 191-202, Winter.
  2. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, December.
  3. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
  4. Riley, John G, 1989. "Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 41-50, Summer.
  5. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
  6. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
  7. Robert A. Feldman & Rajnish Mehra, 1993. "Auctions: Theory and Applications," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(3), pages 485-511, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Marques, Rui Cunha & Berg, Sanford V, 2010. "Revisiting the strengths and limitations of regulatory contracts in infrastructure industries," MPRA Paper 32890, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Uður Emek, 2002. "The Role of Auction Design in Awarding Spectrum," Game Theory and Information 0209001, EconWPA.
  3. Pasquale L. Scandizzo & Marco Ventura, 2008. "A model of public and private partnership through concession contracts," ISAE Working Papers 104, ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics - (Rome, ITALY).
  4. Urs Meister, 2004. "Franchise Bidding in the Water Industry – Auction Schemes and Investment Incentives," Public Economics 0412011, EconWPA.
  5. World Bank, 2003. "Unsolicited Proposals : The Issues for Private Infrastructure Projects," World Bank Other Operational Studies 11305, The World Bank.
  6. Guasch, J. Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stephane, 2003. "Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3011, The World Bank.
  7. Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2009. "Auctions with endogenous participation and quality thresholds : evidence from ODA infrastructure procurement," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4853, The World Bank.
  8. Mario, Cuevas, 2007. "A Practical Guide to the Assessment of the Vulnerability of the Non-Financial Private Sector," MPRA Paper 1375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. World Bank, 2006. "Approaches to Private Participation in Water Services : A Toolkit," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 6982, October.
  10. Jorge Montesinos & Eduardo Saavedra, 2012. "Algunos Alcances en torno a la Institucionalidad y Renegociación de Concesiones en la Infraestructura de Transporte de Uso Público en Perú," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv277, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  11. Eshien Chong & Freddy Huet, 2010. "Partenariats public-privé et investissements de fin de contrat : le cas de l'industrie de l'eau en France," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 76(4), pages 413-448.
  12. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1999. "The Chilean Infrastructure Concessions Program: Evaluation, Lessons and Prospects for the Future," Documentos de Trabajo 60, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  13. Guasch, J. Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stéphane, 2008. "Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America: Evidence from the water and transport sectors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 421-442, March.
  14. J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15024, October.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1957. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.