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Partenariats public-privé et investissement de fin de contrat : le cas de l’industrie de l’eau en France

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Author Info

  • Eshien Chong

    (ADIS/GRJM, Faculté Jean Monnet)

  • Freddy Huet

    (GREDEG, Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis)

Abstract

L’efficacité des partenariats public-privé (PPP) dans les industries de service public en réseau a été remise en cause par de nombreux auteurs. Une des défaillances majeure reprochée à ce type d’accords concerne le manque d’incitation de l’opérateur en place à investir en fin de contrat. Le but de cet article est double. Tout d’abord, nous expliquons pourquoi l’industrie française de l’eau se caractérise par une logique de sous investissement en fin de contrat. Ensuite en utilisant une base de données collectées sur un échantillon de 5000 commune françaises en 2001, nous proposons une série de tests économétriques qui montrent que dans l’industrie de l’eau, les opérateurs privés sont de moins en moins incités à investir lorsque l’échéance du contrat se rapproche. Plus précisément, nous montrons qu’une solution adoptée par les communes pour faire face à ce problème est de se substituer aux firmes privées pour les investissements spécifiques de fin de contrat. Nos résultats confirment ainsi la proposition généralement admise par la théorie des contrats de risque de sous investissement des opérateurs privés en fin de partenariat public-privé.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2010044.

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Length: 35
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2010044

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Keywords: partenariats public-privé; sous investissement; industrie de l’eau;

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References

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  1. Martimort, David & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2006. "Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management Contracts for Public Utilities," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
  2. Stéphane SAUSSIER, 1999. "Transaction Cost Economics and Contract Duration : An Empirical Analysis of EDF Coal Contracts," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1999011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  3. Baldwin, Robert & Cave, Martin, 1999. "Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198774389, September.
  4. Eshien Chong & Freddy Huet & Stéphane Saussier & Faye Steiner, 2006. "Public-Private Partnerships and Prices: Evidence from Water Distribution in France," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 149-169, September.
  5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743.
  6. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, September.
  7. Serge Garcia & Alban Thomas, 2003. "Regulation of Public Utilities under Asymmetric Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(1), pages 145-162, September.
  8. Klein, Michael, 1998. "Bidding for concessions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1957, The World Bank.
  9. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
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