In this paper, we investigate the economics of concession under dynamic uncertainty using real option theory. We analyze the properties of concession as an instrument to privatize investment and management of public resources. In this context, we explore, in particular, three issues: (1) the conditions under which the contract is acceptable to both a public and a private party, (2) the conditions under which it is efficient, i.e. it is preferable to direct development and operation by the public sector, and (3) two different possible equilibrium solutions. Finally, we apply the theoretical results obtained to the case of a major public highway concessionaire in Italy.
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Paper provided by ISAE - Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses - (Rome, ITALY) in its series ISAE Working Papers with number
104.
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