Is Producing a Private Label Counterproductive for a Branded Manufacturer?
AbstractBranded food manufacturers vindicate the use of excess production capacities (idle otherwise) to justify their production of retailers' brands. We study the distributor and food manufacturer's private label strategy for production within a framework featuring endogenous store brand quality, bargaining power, possible differences in production technology and potential capacity constraint for the branded manufacturer. According to the structure of capacity constraint (applying to both products or private label only), the retailer may prefer to choose an independent firm whereas he selected the branded manufacturer when unconstrained. The conclusions of our article thus partially confirm branded manufacturers' thinking: they may produce store brands when they are not capacity constrained
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 09-130.
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol.�39, n°2, 23 mars 2011, p.�213-239.
Other versions of this item:
- Fabian Berg�s & Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache, 2012. "Is producing a private label counterproductive for a branded manufacturer?," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 39(2), pages 213-239, April.
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2010-05-22 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-05-22 (Business Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2010-05-22 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2010-05-22 (Marketing)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Christophe Bontemps & Valérie Orozco & Vincent Réquillart, 2008.
"Private Labels, National Brands and Food Prices,"
Review of Industrial Organization,
Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 1-22, August.
- Ward, Michael B. & Shimshack, Jay P. & Perloff, Jeffrey M. & Harris, J. Michael, 2002.
"Effects of the private-label invasion in food industries,"
22186, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Michael B. Ward & Jay P. Shimshack & Jeffrey M. Perloff & J. Michael Harris, 2002. "Effects of the Private-Label Invasion in Food Industries," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 84(4), pages 961-973.
- Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
- Bergès-Sennou Fabian & Bontems Philippe & Réquillart Vincent, 2004. "Economics of Private Labels: A Survey of Literature," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-25, February.
- Mills, David E, 1995. "Why Retailers Sell Private Labels," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 509-28, Fall.
- Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl & SÃ¸rgard, Lars, 2000.
"Private Labels, Price Rivalry, and Public Policy,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
qt8wh900ks, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Bontems, Philippe & Monier-Dilhan, Sylvette & Requillart, Vincent, 1999. "Strategic Effects of Private Labels," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 26(2), pages 147-65, June.
- Fabian Bergès-Sennou, 2006. "Store loyalty, bargaining power and the private label production issue," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 33(3), pages 315-335, September.
- André Bonfrer & Pradeep K. Chintagunta, 2004. "Store Brands: Who Buys Them and What Happens to Retail Prices When They Are Introduced?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 195-218, 03.
- William Comanor & Patrick Rey, 2000. "Vertical Restraints and the Market Power of Large Distributors," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 135-153, September.
- de Meza, David, 1997. "Product Diversity under Monopoly: Two High Quality Results," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 169-71, April.
- Mills, David E, 1999. "Private Labels and Manufacturer Counterstrategies," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 26(2), pages 125-45, June.
- Berges-Sennou, Fabian & Hassan, Daniel & Monier-Dilhan, Sylvette & Raynal, Helene, 2007. "Consumers' Decision between Private Labels and National Brands in a Retailer's Store: A Mixed Multinomial Logit Application," 103rd Seminar, April 23-25, 2007, Barcelona, Spain 9407, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Tamini, Lota D., 2012. "Optimal quality choice under uncertainty on market development," MPRA Paper 40845, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tamini, Lota Dabio, 2012. "Optimal quality choice under uncertainty on market development," Working Papers 148589, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.