On Social Sanctions and Beliefs: A Pollution Norm Example
AbstractA prevailing view in the literature is that social sanctions can support, in equilibrium, high levels of obedience to a costly norm. The reason is that social disapproval and stigmatization faced by the disobedient are highest when disobedience is the exception rather than the rule in society. In contrast, the (Bayesian) model introduced here shows that imperfect information causes the expected social sanction to be lowest precisely when obedience is more common. This, amongst other fi?ndings, draws a distinct line between social and moral sanctions, both of which may depend on others' ?behavior but not on action observability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-13-04-efd.
Date of creation: 14 Feb 2013
Date of revision:
social interactions; social norms; asymmetric information;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-05-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-05-11 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EVO-2013-05-11 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-05-11 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-RES-2013-05-11 (Resource Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2013-05-11 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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