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The role of warnings in regulation: keeping control with less punishment Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Nyborg, Karine
Telle, Kjetil
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics .
Volume (Year): 88 (2004)
Issue (Month): 12 (December)
Pages: 2801-2816
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:88:y:2004:i:12:p:2801-2816Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000.
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Working Paper Series
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[Downloadable!] Garvie, Devon & Keeler, Andrew, 1994.
"Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 141-162, September.
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Other versions: Livernois, John & McKenna, C.J., 1996.
"Truth or Consequences? Enforcing Pollution Standards ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
Other versions: Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997.
"Evolutionary Game Theory ,"
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Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil, 1999.
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Harrington, Winston, 1988.
"Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted ,"
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Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jšrgen W. Weibull, 1999.
"Social Norms And Economic Incentives In The Welfare State ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35, February.
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Other versions: Livernois, John & McKenna, C. J., 1999.
"Truth or consequences: Enforcing pollution standards with self-reporting ,"
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Rousseau Sandra, 2005.
"The use of warnings when intended and measured emissions differ ,"
Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series
ete0508, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
[Downloadable!]
Nyborg, Karine & Telle, Kjetil, 2004.
"A dissolving paradox: Firms’ compliance to environmental regulation ,"
Memorandum
02/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Kjetil Telle, 2004.
"Effects of inspections on plants' regulatory and environmental performance - evidence from Norwegian manufacturing industries ,"
Discussion Papers
381, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
[Downloadable!]
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