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The logic of the violence in the civil war: The armed conflict in Colombia

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  • Estrada, Fernando

Abstract

This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling / Nozick / Gambetta. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author’s scientific output. A context of conflicts that includes new expressions of violence and the relative failure of the paramilitary reintegration involves using new analytical models (ar- gumentation, game theory and inconsistent information). The recent evolution of emerging gangs and their expansion into areas that were paramilitary camps requires monitoring not only of the government and the authorities, but those investigating the conflict in the present tense. The author provides heuristic research support from Schelling’s theory of strategy, Nozick’s agencies and the protection, and Gambetta’s recent contributions to the relationship between organized crime and drug cartels.

Suggested Citation

  • Estrada, Fernando, 2014. "The logic of the violence in the civil war: The armed conflict in Colombia," MPRA Paper 57160, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57160
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daniel Mejía & Carlos Esteban Posada, 2003. "Capital Destruction, Optimal Defense and Economic Growth," Borradores de Economia 2096, Banco de la Republica.
    2. Joshua D. Angrist & Adriana D. Kugler, 2008. "Rural Windfall or a New Resource Curse? Coca, Income, and Civil Conflict in Colombia," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(2), pages 191-215, May.
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    9. Estrada, Fernando, 2005. "Estado mínimo, agencias de protección y control territorial [Minimum State, control agencies and Territorial protection]," MPRA Paper 20172, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Jan 2010.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Schelling; War Civil; State; Gambetta; Leviathan; Cartel Markets; Organized crime;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • Y80 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Related Disciplines - - - Related Disciplines

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