Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Capital Destruction, Optimal Defense and Economic Growth

Contents:

Author Info

  • Daniel Mejía
  • Carlos Posada

    ()

Abstract

The effects of capital destruction are endogenized in a neoclassical growth model where the economy can optimally allocate part of its labor force to defend capital from being destroyed. The purpose is to explain the optimal allocation of the labor force between productive and deterrence activities along the optimal growth path in response to exogenous terrorist attacks against the material wealth of the economy. The article makes special case to the recent Colombian case and sheds some light on the dramatic increase in the defense activities in Colombia as a result of the increase of terrorist attacks by rebeld groups.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.banrep.gov.co/docum/ftp/borra257.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Banco de la Republica de Colombia in its series Borradores de Economia with number 257.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:257

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Cra 7 # 14-78 Piso 7
Phone: (57-1) 3431111
Fax: (57-1) 2841686
Email:
Web page: http://www.banrep.org/publicaciones/pub_borra.htm
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Capital accumulation; deterrence; capital destruction and economic growth.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Armando Montenegro & Carlos Esteban Posada, . "Criminalidad en Colombia," Borradores de Economia 004, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  2. Alesina, Alberto, et al, 1996. " Political Instability and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 189-211, June.
  3. Roubini, Nouriel & Swagel, Phillip & Ozler, Sule & Alesina, Alberto, 1996. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," Scholarly Articles 4553024, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Herschel I. Grossman & Minseong Kim, 1995. "Predation and Accumulation," NBER Working Papers 5357, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Robert J. Barro, 2003. "Nothing is Sacred: Economic Ideas for the New Millennium," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262524155, December.
  6. Carlos Esteban Posada & Francisco González, 2000. "El gasto en defensa, justicia y seguridad," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 2(2), pages 53-75, January-J.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Adriana Camacho & Catherine Rodriguez, 2013. "Firm Exit and Armed Conflict in Colombia," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 57(1), pages 89-116, February.
  2. Liu, Tao-Xiong & Hu, An-Gang & Zhou, Bi-Hua, 2011. "Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth under External Predation," MPRA Paper 29286, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Julián David Parada, 2008. "Tasa de depreciación endógena y crecimiento económico," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 004594, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
  4. Estrada, Fernando, 2014. "The logic of the violence in the civil war: The armed conflict in Colombia," MPRA Paper 57160, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Adriana Camacho, 2007. "Stress and birth outcomes: evidence from terrorist attacks in Colombia," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 004014, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  6. Hernando Zuleta & Juanita Villaveces, 2008. "Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 005148, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
  7. Estrada, Fernando, 2011. "Heuristic Schelling: economy of organized crime," MPRA Paper 31306, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Arias Andrés F. & Laura Ardila, 2003. "Military Expenditure and Economic Activity: The Colombian Case," REVISTA DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:257. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Camilo Millán).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.