We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach's theory
AbstractThe idea of team-thinking or we-thinking is increasingly drawing the attention of economists. The main claim of scholars who analyze we-thinking is that it is a coherent mode of reasoning people may use when they face a decision problem. But, if there is a general agreement on the existence of the we-mode of reasoning and on the fact people endorse it, scholars have different opinions about the way in which we-thinking arises and how it brings people to behave in a particular way. Then different authors have proposed different analyses of the issue. In this paper I address the issue by proposing a simple model of vacillation between the I and we-modes of reasoning, as a way in which we-thinking can arise in the face of a decision problem. The model is based on a not fully developed intuition - the double-crossing problem in the PD game - of Bacharach, whose theory is the most developed from an analytical point of view.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 25246.
Date of creation: 25 Aug 2010
Date of revision:
we-thinking; frames; vacillation; game theory;
Other versions of this item:
- Alessandra Smerilli, 2012. "We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach’s theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 539-560, October.
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- Z19 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Other
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-10-02 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2010-10-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HPE-2010-10-02 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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