We-thinking and 'double-crossing': frames, reasoning and equilibria
AbstractThe idea of we-thinking, or we-reasoning, is increasingly drawing the attention of more and more economists. The two main contributors are Bacharach and Sugden, and they approach the topic in two different ways. Sugden's aim is to show that we-reasoning is a consistent and logical way of thinking, but he does not face the problem of how we-reasoning can arise. Bacharach's theory is based on frames and his never reached aim (because of his death) was to explain we-thinking in terms of Variable Frame Theory. But some of his intuitions conflict with the logical analysis he proposes. In the present paper, I take a different approach to the way in which we-thinking works. Based on a not fully developed intuition of Bacharach's, i.e. the `double-crossing' problem in Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game, I propose a framework in which a person is allowed to have both I-thoughts, when she is we-reasoning, and we-concepts, when she is I-reasoning, and develop my analysis in terms of equilibrium concepts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 11545.
Date of creation: 02 Nov 2008
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we-thinking; frames; we-equilibria;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-11-18 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-11-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2008-11-18 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sugden, Robert, 2000. "Team Preferences," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(02), pages 175-204, October.
- Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2008. "Groups, cooperation and conflict in games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-17, February.
- Leonardo Becchetti & Giacomo Degli Antoni & Marco Faillo, 2009. "Common reason to believe and framing effect in the team reasoning theory: an experimental approach," Econometica Working Papers wp15, Econometica.
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