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We-thinking and 'double-crossing': frames, reasoning and equilibria

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  • Smerilli, Alessandra

Abstract

The idea of we-thinking, or we-reasoning, is increasingly drawing the attention of more and more economists. The two main contributors are Bacharach and Sugden, and they approach the topic in two different ways. Sugden's aim is to show that we-reasoning is a consistent and logical way of thinking, but he does not face the problem of how we-reasoning can arise. Bacharach's theory is based on frames and his never reached aim (because of his death) was to explain we-thinking in terms of Variable Frame Theory. But some of his intuitions conflict with the logical analysis he proposes. In the present paper, I take a different approach to the way in which we-thinking works. Based on a not fully developed intuition of Bacharach's, i.e. the `double-crossing' problem in Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game, I propose a framework in which a person is allowed to have both I-thoughts, when she is we-reasoning, and we-concepts, when she is I-reasoning, and develop my analysis in terms of equilibrium concepts.

Suggested Citation

  • Smerilli, Alessandra, 2008. "We-thinking and 'double-crossing': frames, reasoning and equilibria," MPRA Paper 11545, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11545
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11545/2/MPRA_paper_11545.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bacharach, Michael, 1999. "Interactive team reasoning: A contribution to the theory of co-operation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 117-147, June.
    2. Daniel John Zizzo & Jonathan H.W. Tan, 2002. "Game Harmony as a Predictor of Cooperation in 2 x 2 Games," Economics Series Working Papers 117, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2008. "Groups, cooperation and conflict in games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-17, February.
    4. Zizzo, Daniel John & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2007. "Perceived harmony, similarity and cooperation in 2 x 2 games: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 365-386, June.
    5. Sugden, Robert, 2000. "Team Preferences," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 175-204, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Leonardo Becchetti & Giacomo Degli Antoni & Marco Faillo, 2009. "Common reason to believe and framing effect in the team reasoning theory: an experimental approach," Econometica Working Papers wp15, Econometica.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    we-thinking; frames; we-equilibria;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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