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Game Harmony as a Predictor of Cooperation in 2 x 2 Games

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Author Info
Daniel John Zizzo
Jonathan H.W. Tan

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Abstract

This paper presents an experimental test of the relationship between game harmony and cooperation in 2 x 2 games. Game harmony measures describe how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of players are, as embodied in the payoffs: coordination games and constant-sum games are examples of games of perfect harmony and disharmony, respectively, with most games being somewhere in the middle. In our experiment we consider a variety of 2 x 2 games, including amongst others the Prisoner`s Dilemma, the Stag-Hunt, the Chicken, a coordination game and three variants of trust games. We find that simple game harmony measures can explain 2/3 (or more) or the variance in mean cooperation rate across these games.

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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 117.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:117

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Related research
Keywords: game harmony; cooperation; 2 x 2 games; trust games; social dilemmas.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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  1. Smerilli, Alessandra, 2008. "We-thinking and 'double-crossing': frames, reasoning and equilibria," MPRA Paper 11545, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.

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