The economics of solidarity: A conceptual framework
AbstractFor many people "solidarity" has become a meaningless word used in slogans - too often used without leading to any economic consequences. We show in this paper conditions under which solidarity can be a powerful instrument. In a solidary action, an individual in a group contributes to a series of actions that aims for a reallocation of scarce resources. The willingness to contribute is mainly influenced by the efficiency of the objective of the solidary action, and is enhanced by feelings of mutual exchange (solidarity) within a group. --
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
Volume (Year): 36 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175
Other versions of this item:
- Kritikos, Alexander S. & Bolle, Friedel & Tan, Jonathan H. W., 2005. "The Economics of Solidarity: A Conceptual Framework," Discussion Papers 233, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
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