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On the Relative Strengths of Altruism and Fairness

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  • Jonathan Tan

    ()

  • Friedel Bolle

    ()

Abstract

Some researchers have attributed deviations from selfish behavior to fairness. Violations of fairness theories, however, are observed in experimental dictator games with transfer rates greater than 1 (a transfer of x from the dictator yields an income of tx for the beneficiary, where x > tx): the dictator’s final income is less than the beneficiary’s. We theoretically propose that dictator giving also involves altruism, further supporting our claim with empirical evidence from four separate samples of dictator game experiments. Our nonlinear specification allows the relative measurement of the independent motives in dictator behavior. Copyright Springer 2006

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 60 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Pages: 35-67

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:60:y:2006:i:1:p:35-67

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

Related research

Keywords: altruism; fairness; dictator game; transfer rate; social welfare;

References

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  1. Ernesto Reuben & Frans van Winden, 2006. "Negative Reciprocity and the Interaction of Emotions and Fairness Norms," CESifo Working Paper Series 1685, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Zizzo, D.J. & Oswald, A., 2000. "Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others' Incomes?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 568, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  3. Bolle, Friedel & Kritikos, Alexander S., 2004. "Altruistic Behavior Under Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 229, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Stefan Kohler, 2005. "Fairness vs. Social Welfare in Experimental Decisions," Economics Working Papers ECO2005/11, European University Institute.
  2. Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2008. "Groups, cooperation and conflict in games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-17, February.
  3. Friedel Bolle & Yves Breitmoser & Jana Heimel & Claudia Vogel, 2012. "Multiple motives of pro-social behavior: evidence from the solidarity game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(3), pages 303-321, March.
  4. Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2006. "Religion and social preferences: An experimental study," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 60-67, January.
  5. Kritikos, Alexander S. & Bolle, Friedel & Tan, Jonathan H. W., 2005. "The Economics of Solidarity: A Conceptual Framework," Discussion Papers 233, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
  6. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2011. "Ultimata bargaining: generosity without social motives," MPRA Paper 33613, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Okhrin, Irena & Richter, Knut, 2010. "The linear dynamic lot size problem with minimum order quantities," Discussion Papers 283, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
  8. Okhrin, Irena & Richter, Knut, 2011. "An O(T3) algorithm for the capacitated lot sizing problem with minimum order quantities," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 211(3), pages 507-514, June.
  9. Lars Schwettmann, 2012. "Competing allocation principles: time for compromise?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 357-380, September.
  10. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2013. "Reference dependent altruism in demand bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 127-140.
  11. Stefan Kohler, 2012. "Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(3), pages 119-137, September.
  12. Kohler, Stefan, 2013. "Inequality aversion causes equal or unequal division in alternating-offer bargaining," MPRA Paper 40764, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Otto, Ilona M. & Wechsung, Frank, 2014. "The effects of rules and communication in a behavioral irrigation experiment with power asymmetries carried out in North China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 10-20.

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