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Equal split in the informal market for group train travel

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  • Waichman, Israel
  • Requate, Till
  • Korzhenevych, Artem

Abstract

In this paper, we make use of a unique dataset collected at the central train station of the city of Kiel, Germany. Group tickets are used by individual proposers looking for co-travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure. The shared ride is offered for a fixed price. We observe that the prevailing price offer corresponds to an equal split of the ticket cost between the maximum possible number of co-travelers. This result is remarkable, because the positions of the bargaining parties are clearly asymmetric and formation of the full group is not guaranteed.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 118 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 327-329

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:2:p:327-329

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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Keywords: Natural experiment; Bargaining; Focal point; Equal split;

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  1. Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2001. "The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 161-169, October.
  2. Bacharach, Michael & Bernasconi, Michele, 1997. "The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-45, April.
  3. Antoni Bosch-Dom�nech & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2008. "On the Role of Non-equilibrium Focal Points as Coordination Devices," Working Papers 621, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  4. Simon Gächter & Arno Riedl, 2005. "Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(2), pages 249-263, February.
  5. Maarten Janssen, 2001. "Rationalizing Focal Points," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 119-148, March.
  6. Janssen, Maarten C.W., 2006. "On the strategic use of focal points in bargaining situations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 622-634, October.
  7. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2003. "Reasons for Conflict: Lessons from Bargaining Experiments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(1), pages 171-, March.
  8. Kagel, John H. & Kim, Chung & Moser, Donald, 1996. "Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 100-110, March.
  9. Sugden, Robert, 1995. "A Theory of Focal Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 533-50, May.
  10. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
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