Equal split in the informal market for group train travel
Abstract
In this paper, we make use of a unique dataset collected at the central train station of the city of Kiel, Germany. Group tickets are used by individual proposers looking for co-travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure. The shared ride is offered for a fixed price. We observe that the prevailing price offer corresponds to an equal split of the ticket cost between the maximum possible number of co-travelers. This result is remarkable, because the positions of the bargaining parties are clearly asymmetric and formation of the full group is not guaranteed.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 118 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 327-329
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Related research
Keywords: Natural experiment; Bargaining; Focal point; Equal split;Other versions of this item:
- Israel Waichman & Artem Korzhenevych & Till Requate, 2010. "Equal Split in the Informal Market for Group Train Travel," Kiel Working Papers 1638, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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