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Ultimatum Games and Wages: Evidence of an “Implicit Bargain”?

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Author Info
Kerstin Pull

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that both ultimatum game outcomes and wages may be in¬fluenced by what the result of a bargain would have been: The players in the ultimatum game, just as the parties to the labor contract, seem to engage in what may be called an “implicit” or, in Selten' s words, an “imaginary” bargain. In determining ultimatum game outcomes, assuming an implicit bargain can account for the experimental evidence on the role of responder bargaining power. Moreover, the implications of the implicit bar¬gain for the wage setting process are compatible with the stylized facts of wage determination.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by LMU Munich School of Management in its journal Schmalenbach Business Review.

Volume (Year): 55 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 161-171
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Handle: RePEc:sbr:abstra:v:55:y:2003:i:2:p:161-171

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Related research
Keywords: Ultimatum Game; Wage Determination; Nash Bargain.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executive Compensation

Cited by:
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  1. Maarten C.W. Janssen, 2006. "On the Strategic Use of Focal Points in Bargaining Situations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-040/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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