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Positive Harmony Transformations and Equilibrium Selection in Two-Player Games

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Daniel John Zizzo

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Abstract

Game harmony is a generic game property that describes how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of players are, as embodied in the payoffs. It can be used to predict cooperation in two-player games. We show how, for large enough positive harmony transformations of the game, a utilitarian solution is always a Nash equilibrium, coincides with the Nash bargaining solution and acquires further desirable properties of payoff and risk dominance. Case-based reasoning and team reasoning are alternative mechanisms by which game harmony measures can successfully predict cooperative behavior.

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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 197.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:197

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Related research
Keywords: Cooperation Game Harmony Payoff Dominance Risk Dominance

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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