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A note on non-competes, bargaining and training by firms

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Author Info
Nicola Meccheri

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Abstract

This paper analyzes how non-competes, via wage bargaining, can affect firms’ incentives to provide their employees with on-the-job training. The results show that non-competes increase incentives to provide general training, but reduce those related to specific training.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy in its series Discussion Papers with number 2008/72.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pie:dsedps:2008/72

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Related research
Keywords: non-competes; bargaining; general training; specific training;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 1995. "Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 336-67, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2006. "The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: on the Interaction of General and Specific Investments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 903-923, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jorn-Steffen, 1999. "Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages F112-42, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Malcomson, J.M., 1997. "Contracts, Hold-Up and Labor Markets," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9703, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
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  6. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1993. "Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 811-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Luca Gori, 2009. "Endogenous fertility, family policy and multiple equilibria," Discussion Papers 2009/79, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  2. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2009. "On economic growth and minimum wages," Discussion Papers 2009/78, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  3. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2009. "Longevity, fertility and PAYG pension systems sustainability," Discussion Papers 2009/77, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2009. "Child policy solutions for the unemployment problem," Discussion Papers 2009/76, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.

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