Labour disputes, investment decisions and the judiciary
AbstractIn this article, we show that the presence of the judiciary in the background of labour relationships is not neutral within these relations: its potential intervention in case of an ex-post layoff and conflict over the severance payment can promote ex-ante efficient specific investment decisions. This ability to promote efficiency depends on the judiciary's aptitude to balance out the parties' ex-post bargaining powers. Interestingly one of the results shows that, if workers' bargaining power in wage negotiations is low, which implies that they expect low returns from continuing the relationships, an increase in the exogenous layoff probability should lead judges to be less lenient towards them.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Labour Economics.
Volume (Year): 17 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/labeco
Employment protection Judiciary Investment incentives Bargaining;
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