Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information
AbstractThis paper reviews a recent literature that extends the Rubinstein/Stahl bargaining model to the case of contract bargaining. Theoretical issues, such as the appropriate game form, existence, and uniqueness of equilibria, are discussed. The paper finishes with a brief overview of some applications of the framework.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 28 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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- MacLeod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M., 1994. "Contract bargaining with symmetric information," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9409, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
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