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Termination restrictions and investment in general training

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  • Fella, Giulio

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 49 (2005)
Issue (Month): 6 (August)
Pages: 1479-1499

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:49:y:2005:i:6:p:1479-1499

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References

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  1. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October.
  2. W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 1995. "Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 336-67, May.
  3. Thomas J. Kane & Dietmar Harhoff, 1997. "Is the German apprenticeship system a panacea for the U.S. labor market?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-196.
  4. Lorne Carmichael, 1981. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Working Papers 452, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  5. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-60, March.
  6. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1993. "Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 811-37, September.
  7. Jacob Mincer, 1988. "Job Training, Wage Growth, and Labor Turnover," NBER Working Papers 2690, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1999. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 539-572, June.
  9. James M. Malcomson, 1997. "Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(4), pages 1916-1957, December.
  10. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114, January.
  11. Brown, James N, 1989. "Why Do Wages Increase with Tenure? On-the-Job Training and Life-Cycle Wage Growth Observed within Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 971-91, December.
  12. Donald B. Hausch & Yeon-Koo Che, 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March.
  13. Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2003. "Transfer fee regulations in European football," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 645-668, August.
  14. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  15. Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B., 1994. "Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 154-168, September.
  16. Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu & Bentley MacLeod, W., 1989. "Optimal labor contracts with non-contractible human capital," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 385-402, December.
  17. Acemoglu, Daron, 1997. "Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 445-64, July.
  18. Giulio Fella, 1999. "When Do Firing Costs Matter?," Working Papers 400, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  19. Lazear, Edward P, 1990. "Job Security Provisions and Employment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(3), pages 699-726, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Giulio Fella, 2012. "Matching, Wage Rigidities and Efficient Severance Pay," Working Papers 698, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  2. Nikolai Staehler, 2006. "Employment Protection: Its Effects on Different Skill Groups and on the Incentive to become Skilled," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 226(1), pages 41-54, January.
  3. Nicola Meccheri, 2008. "A note on non-competes, bargaining and training by firms," Discussion Papers 2008/72, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  4. Decreuse, Bruno & Granier, Pierre, 2013. "Unemployment benefits, job protection, and the nature of educational investment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 20-29.
  5. Ashok Thomas & Luca Spataro, 2013. "Pension funds and Market Efficiency: A review," Discussion Papers 2013/164, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  6. Giulio Fella, 2007. "Optimal Severance Pay in a Matching Model," Working Papers 07-02, Utrecht School of Economics.
  7. Montizaan, Raymond & Cörvers, Frank & de Grip, Andries, 2008. "Training Background and Early Retirement," IZA Discussion Papers 3504, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Giorgio Brunello & Maria De Paola, 2004. "Market Failures and the Under-Provision of Training," CESifo Working Paper Series 1286, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. International Labour Office, 2012. "Global employment trends for youth : 2012," Global Employment Trends Reports 480201, International Labour Office, Economic and Labour Market Analysis Department.
  10. Felipe Balmaceda, 2008. "Firm-Provided Training and Labor Market Policies," Documentos de Trabajo 252, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.

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