Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

International Capital Mobility: Which Structural Policies Reduce Financial Fragility?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Rudiger Ahrend
  • Antoine Goujard
  • Cyrille Schwellnus

Abstract

The structure of a country’s external liabilities, as well as the extent and nature of its international financial integration are key determinants of its vulnerability to financial crises. This is confirmed by new empirical analysis covering OECD and emerging economies over the past four decades. For example, a bias in gross external liabilities towards debt has raised crisis risk. The same holds for "currency mismatch" which refers to a situation where a country's foreign-currency denominated liabilities are large compared to its foreign-currency denominated assets. In addition, international banking integration has been a major vector of contagion, and even more so when cross-border bank lending was primarily short-term. Vulnerability to contagion has been lower when global liquidity has been abundant, underlining the importance of major central banks ensuring ample international liquidity at times of financial turmoil. Structural policies can increase financial stability, typically through their effects on the composition of the external financial account or on the vulnerability to contagion-induced financial shocks. Lower barriers on foreign direct investment and lower product market regulations have increased financial stability by shifting external liabilities from debt towards FDI. In contrast, tax systems that favour debt finance over equity finance have undermined stability by increasing the share of debt, including external debt, in corporate financing. Targeted capital controls on inflows from credit operations have reduced the impact of financial contagion, not least by shifting the structure of external liabilities. Stricter information disclosure rules or capital requirements, and strong supervisory authorities have also reduced countries' financial crisis risk. Flux de capitaux internationaux : quelles politiques structurelles réduisent la fragilité financière ? La structure des engagements externes des pays, ainsi que l’ampleur et les différentes formes de leur intégration financière internationale, sont d’importants facteurs de vulnérabilité aux crises financières. Ceci est confirmé par une nouvelle analyse empirique couvrant les pays membres de l’OCDE et les pays émergents pendant les quatre dernières décennies. Par exemple, un biais des engagements externes vers la dette a augmenté les risques de crises. De même, un excès d’engagements libellés en monnaie étrangère par rapport aux créances libellées en monnaie étrangère a accru les risques de crises. En outre, l’intégration bancaire internationale a été un important vecteur de contagion, d’autant plus que la part de la dette bancaire de court-terme était importante. La vulnérabilité des pays à la contagion a aussi été moindre lorsque la liquidité globale était abondante, ce qui souligne l’importance d’une réaction des banques centrales assurant un niveau de liquidité internationale élevée lors des périodes d’instabilité financière. Les politiques structurelles peuvent contribuer à accroître la stabilité financière, tant par leurs effets sur la structure des engagements externes que par leurs effets sur la vulnérabilité aux chocs financiers liés aux épisodes de contagion. De faibles barrières aux investissements directs étrangers ainsi qu’une réglementation des marchés de produits favorable à la compétition ont contribué à la stabilité financière en modifiant les engagements externes des pays vers les IDEs au contraire de la dette. En revanche, les systèmes de taxation qui favorisent le financement par la dette au détriment des investissements de capitaux ont contribué à réduire la stabilité financière en augmentant le financement des entreprises par la dette, y compris la dette externe. Des mesures ciblées de contrôle des flux de crédits ont contribué à réduire les effets de contagion financière, notamment en modifiant la composition des engagements internationaux. Des règles plus strictes quant à la divulgation des résultats financiers et quant aux fonds propres requis, ainsi qu'une plus forte supervision des autorités ont aussi réduit les risques de crises financières.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k97gkcv5z27-en
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by OECD Publishing in its series OECD Economic Policy Papers with number 2.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 11 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaab:2-en

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2 rue Andre Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Phone: 33-(0)-1-45 24 82 00
Fax: 33-(0)-1-45 24 85 00
Email:
Web page: http://www.oecd.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: structural policy; structural adjustment; debt; capital controls; contagion; bank regulation; financial account; bank balance sheet; asset mismatch; financial integration; banking crises; financial stability; compte financier; dette externe; contrôle des flux de capitaux; crise bancaire; excès de demande d’actifs sûrs; intégration financière; réglementation bancaire; stabilité financière; politique structurelle;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," NBER Working Papers 7265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, 2001. "Bank Lending and Contagion: Evidence from the Asian Crisis," NBER Chapters, in: Regional and Global Capital Flows: Macroeconomic Causes and Consequences, NBER-EASE Volume 10, pages 73-99 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Peter Blair Henry, 2006. "Capital Account Liberalization: Theory, Evidence, and Speculation," NBER Working Papers 12698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Schularick, Moritz & Taylor, Alan M., 2009. "Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870-2008," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7570, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Ralph De Haas & Neeltje Van Horen, 2013. "Running for the Exit? International Bank Lending During a Financial Crisis," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(1), pages 244-285.
  6. Davide Furceri & Stéphanie Guichard & Elena Rusticelli, 2011. "Episodes of Large Capital Inflows and the Likelihood of Banking and Currency Crises and Sudden Stops," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 865, OECD Publishing.
  7. Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2011. "Sovereign Default Risk and Bank Fragility in Financially Integrated Economies," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 59(2), pages 162-194, June.
  8. Mahir Binici & Michael M. Hutchison & Martin Schindler, 2009. "Controlling Capital? Legal Restrictions and the Asset Composition of International Financial Flows," IMF Working Papers 09/208, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Rudiger Ahrend & Jens Arnold & Fabrice Murtin, 2011. "Have more strictly regulated banking systems fared better during the recent financial crisis?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(5), pages 399-403.
  10. Henry Louie & Donald Rousslang, 2008. "Host-country governance, tax treaties and US direct investment abroad," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 256-273, June.
  11. Ralph de Haas & Iman van Lelyveld, 2006. "Internal Capital Markets and Lending by Multinational Bank Subsidiaries," DNB Working Papers, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department 101, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  12. Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, 2000. "The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI Activity," NBER Working Papers 7929, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Galina Hale, 2011. "Bank Relationships, Business Cycles, and Financial Crises," NBER Working Papers 17356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Nicola Cetorelli & Linda S Goldberg, 2011. "Global Banks and International Shock Transmission: Evidence from the Crisis," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 59(1), pages 41-76, April.
  15. Peter Henry, 2007. "Capital Account Liberalization: Theory, Evidence, and Speculation," Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 07-004, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  16. Barry Eichengreen & Ricardo Hausmann, 1999. "Exchange rates and financial fragility," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 329-368.
  17. Domac, Ilker & Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad, 2003. "Banking crises and exchange rate regimes: is there a link?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 41-72, October.
  18. Davide Furceri & Annabelle Mourougane, 2009. "The Effect of Financial Crises on Potential Output: New Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 699, OECD Publishing.
  19. Chikako Baba & Annamaria Kokenyne, 2011. "Effectiveness of Capital Controls in Selected Emerging Markets in the 2000's," IMF Working Papers 11/281, International Monetary Fund.
  20. Valerie Cerra & Sweta Chaman Saxena, 2008. "Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 439-57, March.
  21. Guillermo A. Calvo & Carmen M. Reinhart, 2002. "Fear Of Floating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 117(2), pages 379-408, May.
  22. Reinhart, Carmen & Kaminsky, Graciela, 1999. "The twin crises: The causes of banking and balance of payments problems," MPRA Paper 14081, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Jack M. Mintz, 1992. "Is There a Future for Capital Income Taxation?," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 108, OECD Publishing.
  24. Dani Rodrik & Andres Velasco, 1999. "Short-Term Capital Flows," NBER Working Papers 7364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. André Faria & Philip R. Lane & Paolo Mauro & Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 2007. "The Shifting Composition of External Liabilities," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series, IIIS iiisdp190, IIIS.
  26. Edison, Hali & Reinhart, Carmen M., 2001. "Stopping hot money," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 533-553, December.
  27. Benmelech, Efraim & Dvir, Eyal, 2013. "Does Short-Term Debt Increase Vulnerability to Crisis? Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 485-494.
  28. Ralph De Haas & Yevgeniya Korniyenko & Elena Loukoianova & Alexander Pivovarsky, 2012. "Foreign Banks and the Vienna Initiative: Turning Sinners into Saints?," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences 62, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
  29. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  30. Tatiana Didier & Inessa Love & María Soledad Martínez Pería, 2012. "What explains comovement in stock market returns during the 2007–2008 crisis?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(2), pages 182-202, 04.
  31. Montiel, Peter & Reinhart, Carmen M., 1999. "Do capital controls and macroeconomic policies influence the volume and composition of capital flows? Evidence from the 1990s," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 619-635, August.
  32. Reinhart, Carmen & Smith, R Todd, 2002. "Temporary controls on capital inflows," MPRA Paper 13863, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  33. Clovis Kerdrain & Isabell Koske & Isabelle Wanner, 2011. "Current Account Imbalances: can Structural Reforms Help to Reduce Them?," OECD Journal: Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, OECD Publishing, vol. 2011(1), pages 1-44.
  34. Ralph de Haas & Iman van Lelyveld, 2011. "Multinational Banks and the Global Financial Crisis. Weathering the Perfect Storm?," DNB Working Papers, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department 322, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  35. Rudiger Ahrend & Jens Arnold & Fabrice Murtin, 2009. "Prudential Regulation and Competition in Financial Markets," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 735, OECD Publishing.
  36. Atif Mian & Asim Ijaz Khwaja, 2006. "Tracing the Impact of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from an Emerging Market," NBER Working Papers 12612, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  37. Michael Keen & Alexander Klemm & Victoria Perry, 2010. "Tax and the Crisis," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 31(1), pages 43-79, 03.
  38. Joseph Joyce, 2011. "Financial Globalization and Banking Crises in Emerging Markets," Open Economies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(5), pages 875-895, November.
  39. Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos, 1985. "Good-bye financial repression, hello financial crash," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 1-24.
  40. Patrick Slovik & Boris Cournède, 2011. "Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 844, OECD Publishing.
  41. Dan Andrews & Aida Caldera Sánchez & Åsa Johansson, 2011. "Housing Markets and Structural Policies in OECD Countries," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 836, OECD Publishing.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Luiz A. Pereira da Silva, 2013. "Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability: A Perspective from the Developing World," Working Papers Series, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department 324, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
  2. Volker Ziemann, 2012. "Debt and Macroeconomic Stability: Debt and the Business Cycle," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1005, OECD Publishing.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaab:2-en. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.