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Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe

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  • Daniel S. Hamermesh
  • Gerard A. Pfann

Abstract

We develop a theory of the market for individual reputation, an indicator of regard by one’s peers and others. The central questions are: 1) Does the quantity of exposures raise reputation independent of their quality? and 2) Assuming that overall quality matters for reputation, does the quality of an individual’s most important exposure have an extra effect on reputation? Using evidence for academic economists, we find that, conditional on its impact, the quantity of output has no or even a negative effect on each of a number of proxies for reputation, and very little evidence that a scholar’s most influential work provides any extra enhancement of reputation. Quality ranking matters more than absolute quality. Data on mobility and salaries show, on the contrary, substantial positive effects of quantity, independent of quality. We test various explanations for the differences between the determinants of reputation and salary.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15527.

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Date of creation: Nov 2009
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Publication status: published as "Reputation and Earnings: The Role of Quality and Quantity in Academe," Economic Inquiry, 50(1): 1-16 (January 2012)
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15527

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  1. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2008. "Status incentives," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 5913, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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  7. Kahn, Lawrence M, 1993. "Free Agency, Long-Term Contracts and Compensation in Major League Baseball: Estimates from Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(1), pages 157-64, February.
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  13. Aloysius Siow, 1991. "Are First Impressions Important in Academia?," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 26(2), pages 236-255.
  14. Ransom, Michael R, 1993. "Seniority and Monopsony in the Academic Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 221-33, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Matteo Migheli & Giovanni B. Ramello, 2014. "Open Access Journals & Academics’ Behaviour," ICER Working Papers 03-2014, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  2. Robert Hofmeister & Matthias Krapf, 2011. "How Do Editors Select Papers, and How Good are They at Doing It?," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2011-37, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  3. Glenn Ellison, 2010. "How Does the Market Use Citation Data? The Hirsch Index in Economics," NBER Working Papers 16419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Oswald, Andrew J., 2009. "A Suggested Method for the Measurement of World-Leading Research (Illustrated with Data on Economics)," IZA Discussion Papers 4313, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. KRAPF, Matthias & SCHLÄPFER, Jörg, 2012. "How Nobel Laureates Would Perform In The Handelsblatt Ranking," Regional and Sectoral Economic Studies, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 12(3).

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