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A Theory of Association: Social Status, Prices and Markets

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Author Info
Basu, Kaushik

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Abstract

The utility from some commodities depends on the allocation rule used to distribute them because, by the acquisition of such a commodity, a person tries to gain "association" with its other recipients. Such a commodity is called an association good and it is shown that its existence can jeopardize the economist's standard model of markets. For example, demand may not equal supply in equilibrium and the very use of the price mechanism to distribute an association good could diminish its value. These and other properties are illustrated by analyzing some specific association goods, like club memberships and school admissions. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 41 (1989)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 653-71
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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:41:y:1989:i:4:p:653-71

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  1. Prufer, J. & Walz, U., 2007. "How Does Clubs' Organizational Design Affect Competition Among Clubs?," Discussion Paper 2007-011, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Gary Biglaiser & James Friedman, 2004. "Membership Diversity in Club Decisions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
  3. Chaim Fershtman & Yoram Weiss, 1991. "Social Status, Culture and Economic Performance," Discussion Papers 1007, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Philip R. P. Coelho & James E. McClure, 1996. "Social context and the utility of wealth: Addressing the Markowitz challenge," Working Papers 199602, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Daniel S. Hamermesh & Peter Schmidt, 2001. ""Hall of Fame" Voting: The Econometric Society," NBER Working Papers 8435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Gordon C. Winston, 1999. "Subsidies, Hierarchy and Peers: The Awkward Economics of Higher Education," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 13-36, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & Aldo Rustichini, 2008. "Social Decision Theory: Choosing within and between Groups," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 71, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  8. Robert Oxoby, 2009. "Social Inference and Occupational Choice: Type-Based Biases in a Bayesian Model of Class Formation," Working Papers 2009-07, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 11 Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
  9. Friedel Bolle & Matthew Braham, . "A Difficulty with Oaths: On Trust, Trustworthiness, and Signalling," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003-1-1055, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  10. Anandi Mani & Charles H. Mullin, 2000. "Social Approval and Occupational Choice," Working Papers 0041, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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