What Have you Done for me Lately? Release of Information and Strategic Manipulation of Memories
AbstractHow should a rational agent (politician/employee/advertiser) release information in order to manipulate the memory imperfections of his forgetful assessor (electorate/supervisor/consumer)? This article attempts to answer this question using a memory model based on the principles of recency, similarity and repetition. I show that the problem of a rational agent who releases information to a forgetful assessor can be modelled as a standard dynamic optimisation problem and we describe the properties of the optimal profile for releasing information. The theoretical results are applicable in a wide range of social and economic contexts, such as political campaigns, employee performance evaluations and advertising strategies. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 117 (2007)
Issue (Month): 518 (03)
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