Does Raiding Explain The Negative Returns To Faculty Seniority?
Abstract"We track faculty for 30 yr at five PhD-granting departments of economics. Two-thirds of faculty who take alternative employment move downward; less than one-quarter moves upward. We find a substantial penalty for seniority, even after richly controlling for faculty productivity, and the penalty is little changed when we allow wages and returns to seniority to differ by mobility status. Faculty who end up moving to better or comparable positions were penalized as severely for seniority while they were in our sample as faculty who stay. These results are incompatible with the raiding hypothesis. Faculty from top 10 programs are also punished for seniority but to a lesser degree than other faculty, which could reflect reduced monopsony power against such faculty if they are more marketable. All results persist when we control for prospective publications and allow lower returns for older publications. Match-quality bias has dissipated in the post-internet period, which may be the consequence of greater availability of information. "("JEL" J62, J44, J42) Copyright (c) 2009 Western Economic Association International.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 48 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (07)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J62 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Job, Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
- J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
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- Hamermesh, Daniel S. & Pfann, Gerard A., 2009.
"Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe,"
IZA Discussion Papers
4610, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Daniel S. Hamermesh & Gerard A. Pfann, 2009. "Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe," NBER Working Papers 15527, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hamermesh, Daniel S. & Pfann, Gerard Antonie, 2009. "Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe," CEPR Discussion Papers 7603, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hilmer, Christiana E. & Hilmer, Michael J. & Ransom, Michael R., 2012. "Fame and the Fortune of Academic Economists: How the Market Rewards Influential Research in Economics," IZA Discussion Papers 6960, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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