This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-GTH-2003-07-13 (Game Theory)
• NEP-MIC-2003-07-13 (Microeconomics)
• NEP-POL-2003-07-13 (Positive Political Economics)

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    • Ted Bergstrom, 2003. "The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 2003C, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
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22. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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