"Group selection" is often cited as an explanation for the survival of altruism. The idea of group selection is a controversial one - much effort has been expended on its justification (and refutation). Relatively little effort has gone into formally testing whether or not it can actually provide a reasonable explanation for altruistic behaviour. This paper concentrates solely on whether or not a group structure enables the survival of altruism in an evolving population. If altruism is to flourish either groups need to be isolated from each other for multiple generations, or groups themselves need to be constructed in a positively assortative manner.
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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number
9967.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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