The Algebra of Assortativity and the Evolution of Cooperation

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The Algebra of Assortativity and the Evolution of Cooperation

Author Info

Ted Bergstrom (UCSB)

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Ted Bergstrom

Abstract

This paper presents an evolutionary game theoretic analysis of the dynamics of a population of prisoners' dilemma players where the probability of encountering an cooperator is higher for cooperators than for noncooperators. Examples from biological and cultural evolution are presented. There is also a discussion of voluntary matching where one's type is informatively, but imperfectly signalled.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0106002.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 22 Jun 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0106002

Note: Type of Document - TeX document in pdf; prepared on TeX; to print on HP/PostScript/ ; pages: 25; figures: .
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2001-07-13 (All new papers)
NEP-EVO-2001-07-13 (Evolutionary Economics)
NEP-GTH-2001-07-13 (Game Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Bergstrom, T.C. & Stark, O., 1993. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," Papers 93-01, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
Other versions:
- Ted Bergstrom & Oded Stark, . "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," Papers _024, University of Michigan, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Theodore C. Bergstrom & Oded Stark, 1994. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," Microeconomics 9401001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Ted Bergstrom & Oded Stark, 1993. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1993B, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
- Bergstrom, Theodore C & Stark, Oded, 1993. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 149-55, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1995. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 58-81, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ted Bergstrom, 1995. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1995A, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
- Theodore C. Bergstrom, . "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," ELSE working papers 017, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Ted Bergstrom, . "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," Papers _023, University of Michigan, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Thierry Vignolo, 2003. "Reputation by imitation: an evolutionary chain-store game with strategic matching," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(4), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2002. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 67-88, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Chun Lei Yang & Ching Syang Jack Yue, 2004. "The Rise of Cooperation in Correlated Matching Prisoners Dilemma: An Experiment," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000097, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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