Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Altruism and welfare when preferences are endogenous

Contents:

Author Info

  • Anders Poulsen

    (University of East Anglia)

  • Odile Poulsen

    (University of East Anglia)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We study whether an altruistic preference can survive in competition with other preferences and investigate the relationship between the equilibrium proportion of altruism and equilibrium material and subjective welfare. Altruism survives whenever preferences are sufficiently observable. Altruism can co-exist with reciprocal and materialistic preferences. Any policy that increases the equilibrium proportion of altruism raises economic prosperity but can reduce some people's subjective equilibrium welfare. Some of the policies that increase the equilibrium proportion of altruism are, at first sight at least, counter-intuitive. There can be a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of anonymity of interaction in society (the probability that an individual knows other people's preferences) in society and welfare.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.uea.ac.uk/documents/166500/0/CBESS-09-02.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. in its series Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) with number 09-02.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 01 Oct 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:uea:wcbess:09-02

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Norwich NR4 7TI
    Phone: 44 1603 591131
    Fax: +44(0)1603 4562592
    Web page: http://www.uea.ac.uk/eco/
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Postal: Helen Chapman, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK
    Email:

    Related research

    Keywords: altriusm; endogenous preferences; material and subjective welfare; indirect evoluationary approach;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Witt, Ulrich, 1991. "Economics, sociobiology and behavioral psychology on preferences," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 557-573, December.
    2. Bernheim, B Douglas & Stark, Oded, 1988. "Altruism within the Family Reconsidered: Do Nice Guys Finish Last?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1034-45, December.
    3. Ted Bergstrom & Oded Stark, . "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," Papers _024, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
    4. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2002. "Why Social Preferences Matter -- The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages C1-C33, March.
    5. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Korth, Christian & Napel, Stefan, 2003. "Reciprocity - an indirect evolutionary analysis," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 03-32, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    6. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1989. "A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1138-59, October.
    7. Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1986. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," Working Papers 650, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    8. Dirk Engelmann, 2001. "Asymmetric Type Recognition with Applications to Dilemma Games," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 357-375, November.
    9. Theodore C. Bergstrom, . "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," ELSE working papers 017, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    10. Bester, H. & Güth, W., 1994. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?," Discussion Paper 1994-103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. Schelling, Thomas C, 1978. "Altruism, Meanness, and Other Potentially Strategic Behaviors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 229-30, May.
    12. Rotemberg, Julio J, 1994. "Human Relations in the Workplace," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 684-717, August.
    13. Manfred Konigstein & Wieland Muller, 2000. "Combining Rational Choice and Evolutionary Dynamics: The Indirect Evolutionary Approach," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 235-256, 08.
    14. Stark, Oded, 1989. "Altruism and the Quality of Life," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 86-90, May.
    15. Werner Güth & Stefan Napel, 2006. "Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 1037-1056, October.
    16. Becker, Gary S, 1976. "Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 817-26, September.
    17. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-93, Nov.-Dec..
    18. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1977. "Shakespeare vs. Becker on Altruism: The Importance of Having the Last Word," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 500-502, June.
    19. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2002. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 67-88, Spring.
    20. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2003. "Understanding reciprocity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-27, January.
    21. Eshel, Ilan & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 1998. "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 157-79, March.
    22. Possajennikov, Alex, 2000. "On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 125-129, May.
    23. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-77, June.
    24. Anders Poulsen & Odile Poulsen, 2006. "Endogenous Preferences and Social-Dilemma Institutions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(4), pages 627-660, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uea:wcbess:09-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alasdair Brown).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.