Emotions, Sanctions and Cooperation
AbstractWe use skin conductance responses and self-reports of hedonic valence to study the emotional basis of cooperation and punishment in a social dilemma. Emotional reaction to free-riding incites individuals to apply sanctions when they are available. The application of sanctions activates a "virtuous emotional circle" that accompanies cooperation. Emotionally aroused cooperators relieve negative emotions when they punish free riders. In response, the free-riders experience negative emotions when punished, and increase their subsequent level of cooperation. The outcome is an increased level of contribution that becomes the new standard or norm. For a given contribution level, individuals attain higher levels of satisfaction when sanctioning institutions are in place.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 5592.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in: Southern Economic Journal, DOI: 10.4284/0038-4038-2012.067.
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Other versions of this item:
- Mateus Joffily & David Masclet & Charles N. Noussair & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2011. "Emotions, Sanctions and Cooperation," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 2011s-12, CIRANO.
- Matteus Joffily & David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Emotions, Sanctions and Cooperation," Post-Print, HAL halshs-00581163, HAL.
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-04-02 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-04-02 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-04-02 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2011-04-02 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2011-04-02 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ben-Shakhar, Gershon & Bornstein, Gary & Hopfensitz, Astrid & van Winden, Frans, 2007. "Reciprocity and emotions in bargaining using physiological and self-report measures," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 314-323, June.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Fabio Galeotti, 2013. "On the Robustness of Emotions and Behavior in a Power-to-Take Game Experiment," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS), School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 13-07, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Nikiforakis, Nikos & Noussair, Charles N. & Wilkening, Tom, 2012. "Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 797-807.
- David L. Dickinson & Daivd Masclet, 2014. "Emotions and Punishment in Public Good Experiments," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University 14-03, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
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