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When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation

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Author Info
Houser, Daniel
Xiao, Erte
McCabe, Kevin
Smith, Vernon

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Abstract

People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research suggests both "intentions" and incentives underlie this effect. We report data from an experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior. Participants play a one-shot investment experiment in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees, request a return on this investment and, in some treatments, can threaten sanctions to enforce their requests. Decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by investors are compared to decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by nature. When not threatened, trustees typically decide to return a positive amount less than the investor requested. When threatened this decision becomes least common. If the request is large relative to the sanction then most trustees return nothing. If the request is small, trustees typically return the requested amount. These results do not vary with investors' intentions.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4P2J07W-2/1/c8a0d1b9a63051c68be3268ff64dbb0d
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 62 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 509-532
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:2:p:509-532

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Daniel Houser & Robert Kurzban, 2002. "Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1062-1069, September. [Downloadable!]
  3. Blount, Sally, 1995. "When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 131-144, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gary Bolton & Jordi Brandts & Axel Ockenfels, 1998. "Measuring Motivations for the Reciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 207-219, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Offerman, Theo, 2002. "Hurting hurts more than helping helps," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1423-1437, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives," Discussion Papers in Economics 334, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Kreps, David M, 1997. "Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 359-64, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Punishment, Inequality and Emotions," Post-Print halshs-00142866_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Eriksson, Tor & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2008. "Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation," Working Papers 07-12, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, . "Trust, Communication and Contracts: An Experiment," Working Papers 0206, Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus). [Downloadable!]
  4. Xiao, Erte & Bicchieri, Cristina, 2008. "When Equality Trumps Reciprocity: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment," MPRA Paper 9375, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Punishment, inequality, and welfare: a public good experiment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 475-502, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Uri Gneezy & John A. List, 2006. "Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments," NBER Working Papers 12063, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polanía Reyes, 2009. "Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: A preference-Based Lucas Critique of Public Policy," Working Papers 2009-11, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polanía Reyes, 2009. "Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: A Preference-based Lucas Critique of Public Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2006. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 5768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Andersson , Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2007. "Communication and Renegotiation in Two-stage Games," Working Papers 2007:4, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Hörisch, Hannah & Strassmair, Christina, 2008. "An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis," Discussion Papers in Economics 2139, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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