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Social Interactions and the Salience of Social Identity

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Author Info
McLeish, Kendra N. () (University of Calgary)
Oxoby, Robert J. () (University of Calgary)

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Abstract

In this paper, we explore the effect of identity salience on behavior in a simple social interaction. Specifically, we compare behavior in a ultimatum game across three treatments: priming subjects with a shared identity, priming subjects with an identity distinct from those with whom they will interact, and priming subjects with no particular identity. We find that subjects are most cooperative in the identity-priming treatment and least cooperative in the distinctiveness-priming treatment. Similarly, subjects reveal the highest demands in the identity-priming treatment and the lowest demands in the distinctiveness-priming treatment. We discuss the implications of these results with respect to literature on organizational identity.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3554.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3554

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Related research
Keywords: identity; experiments; bargaining;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism
M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Matthew Rabin, 1997. "Bargaining Structure, Fairness and Efficiency," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1033, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2000. "Participation In Heterogeneous Communities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 847-904, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Daniel J. Benjamin & James J. Choi & A. Joshua Strickland, 2007. "Social Identity and Preferences," NBER Working Papers 13309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Oxoby, Robert J. & McLeish, Kendra N., 2004. "Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other-regarding behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 399-405, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Helen Bernhard & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2006. "Group Affiliation and Altruistic Norm Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 217-221, May. [Downloadable!]
  6. Matthew Rabin., 1997. "Bargaining Structure, Fairness and Efficiency," Economics Working Papers E00-280, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  7. Solow, John L. & Kirkwood, Nicole, 2002. "Group identity and gender in public goods experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 403-412, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics And Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Wit, Arjaan P. & Wilke, Henk A. M., 1992. "The effect of social categorization on cooperation in three types of social dilemmas," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 135-151, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Benabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2006. "Identity, Dignity and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets," IDEI Working Papers 437, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Alesina, Alberto & Baqir, Reza & Easterly, William, 1999. "Public goods and ethnic divisions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2108, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 2005. "Managing diversity by creating team identity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 371-392, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Lorenz Goette & David Huffman & Stephan Meier, 2006. "The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups," IZA Discussion Papers 2020, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  14. repec:att:wimass:19199929 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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