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Structured and unstructured bargaining with positive transaction costs: an experimental investigation

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  • Spencer, Michael Andrew

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  • Spencer, Michael Andrew, 1995. "Structured and unstructured bargaining with positive transaction costs: an experimental investigation," ISU General Staff Papers 1995010108000018183, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:1995010108000018183
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