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Allowing exchanges over externalities: From ban to obligation
[Autorisation à l'échange sur des externalités: De l'interdiction à l'obligation]

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  • Elodie Bertrand

    (ISJPS - Institut des sciences juridique et philosophique de la Sorbonne - UMR 8103 - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Negotiation over externalities, as assumed by the "Coase theorem," may be impeded by a moral or social ban on exchanging this type of property right. This article shows that the empirical tests of the "Coase theorem" bring to light three degrees on the spectrum of the moral or social authorization to legitimately exchange externalities: 1) a ban among rural neighbors observed by Ellickson [1986], 2) a permission between the beekeepers and orchard owners studied by Cheung [1973] and 3) a moral incentive in the lab experiments of Hoffman and Spitzer [1982]. This paper thus contributes to the analysis of the interaction between social norms and exchange contracts, by focusing on norms that allow or not contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Elodie Bertrand, 2014. "Allowing exchanges over externalities: From ban to obligation [Autorisation à l'échange sur des externalités: De l'interdiction à l'obligation]," Post-Print hal-03507657, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03507657
    DOI: 10.3917/reco.652.0439
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03507657
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    References listed on IDEAS

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