Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security
AbstractThis paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining. Copyright Springer 2005
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Appalachian State University in its series Working Papers with number 01-01.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in Environmental and Resource Economics
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Postal: Thelma C. Raley Hall, Boone, North Carolina 28608
Web page: http://www.business.appstate.edu/departments/economics/
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Other versions of this item:
- Todd Cherry & Jason Shogren, 2005. "Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(3), pages 349-367, 07.
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- Q0 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General
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