Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security
AbstractThis paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining. Copyright Springer 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental & Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 31 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (07)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263
bargaining; Coase theorem; property rights; valuation; C9; Q0;
Other versions of this item:
- Todd L. Cherry & Jason F. Shogren, 2001. "Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security," Working Papers 01-01, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- Q0 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General
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