Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Explicit Communication and Bargaining Outcomes

Contents:

Author Info

  • Crawford, Vincent P

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199005%2980%3A2%3C213%3AECABO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D&origin=repec
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 80 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 213-19

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:80:y:1990:i:2:p:213-19

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Zoe Bett & Anders Poulsen & Odile Poulsen, 2013. "How Salient is an Equal but Inefficient Outcome in a Coordination Situation? Some Experimental Evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS), School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 13-02-R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  2. Feltovich, Nick & Swierzbinski, Joe, 2011. "The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 554-574, May.
  3. Katharina Holzinger, 2003. "The Problems of Collective Action: A New Approach," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2003_2, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  4. repec:uea:wcbess:13-02 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Randall L. Clavert & James Johnson, . "Interpretation and Coordination in Constitutional Politics," Wallis Working Papers, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy WP14, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  6. Frey, Bruno S. & Bohnet, Iris, 1997. "Identification in democratic society," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 25-38.
  7. Heiner, Ronald Asher & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1995. "Rational Cooperation In One-Shot Simultaneous Pd-Situations," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 95-03, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  8. Crawford, Vincent, 1998. "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 286-298, February.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:80:y:1990:i:2:p:213-19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.