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The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency

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Abstract

This article deals with experimental games as they pertain to game theory. As such there is a natural distinction between experimentation with abstract games devoted to testing a specific hypothesis in game theory and games with a scenario from a discipline such as economics or political science where the game is presented in the context of some particular activity.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d08b/d0891.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 891.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Nov 1988
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3, 2001
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:891

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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

Related research

Keywords: Experimental economics; game theory; experimental methods;

References

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  1. Michael Levine & Charles Plott, 1977. "Agenda influence and its implications," Natural Field Experiments 00294, The Field Experiments Website.
  2. Roth, Alvin E, 1988. "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(393), pages 974-1031, December.
  3. Quint, Thomas & Shubik, Martin, 2001. " Games of Status," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 349-72.
  4. Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1988. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 806-23, September.
  5. James W. Friedman, 1968. "An Experimental Research in Oligopoly," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 246, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. James W. Friedman, 1965. "An Experimental Study of Cooperative Duopoly," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 192, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Roth, Alvin E & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1983. "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 362-72, June.
  8. Alvin E Roth & J K Murnighan, 1997. "The rule of information in bargaining: an experimental study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1631, David K. Levine.
  9. Murnigham, J.K. & Roth, A.E. & Schoumaker, F., 1985. "Risk Aversion in Bargaining: an Experimental Study," Cahiers de recherche 8536, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  10. Brown, James N & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-examination of O'Neill's Game Experiment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1065-81, September.
  11. James T. Hong & Charles R. Plott, 1982. "Rate Filing Policies for Inland Water Transportation: An Experimental Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
  12. Hoffman, Elizabeth & Spitzer, Matthew L, 1982. "The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 73-98, April.
  13. R. J. Aumann & M. Maschler, 1972. "Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 54-63, January.
  14. Martin Shubik, 1979. "Cooperative Game Solutions: Australian, Indian and U.S. Opinions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 517, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  15. Battalio, Raymond C & Kagel, John H & MacDonald, Don N, 1985. "Animals' Choices over Uncertain Outcomes: Some Initial Experimental Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 597-613, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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