The use of tolls is being widespread around the world. Its ability to fund infrastructure projects and to solve budget constraints have been the main rationale behind its renewed interest. However, less attention has been payed to the safety effects derived from this policy in a moment of increasing concern on road fatalities. Pricing best infrastructures shifts some drivers onto worse alternative roads usually not prepared to receive high traffic in comparable safety standards. In this paper we provide evidence of the existence of this perverse consequence by using an international European panel in a two way fixed effects estimation.
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Paper provided by University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics in its series IREA Working Papers with number
200802.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health R48 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Transportation Systems - - - Government Pricing; Regulatory Policies
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Nejat Anbarci & Monica Escaleras & Charles Register, 2006.
"Traffic Fatalities and Public Sector Corruption,"
Working Papers
06004, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University, revised Jul 2006.
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